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21. Introduction
It is U.S. policy to work toward expansion of trade in agricultural commodities. One
mechanism for expansion is the removal, or at least reduction, of the level of barriers to
trade. Such a policy requires knowledge of both levels and effects of different types of
barriers.
In this paper we exploit the wealth of data found in the UNCTAD TRade Analysis
and INformation System (TRAINS) data bases for the years 1994 and 1998 to take a very
detailed look at the effects of tariffs and four types of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on trade in
agricultural commodities. TRAINS provides a comprehensive inventory of bilateral tariffs,
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and trade flows for much of the world. The data are at the six
digit Harmonized Tariff System (HS) level which allows for a very detailed consideration of
sectors and barriers. In so doing, we hope to significantly enhance the level of understainding
regarding the size and effect of barriers to agricultural trade.
In particular, we are able to study separately 20 agricultural and processed food sectors.
In order to understand changes over time and differences according to the level of devel-
opment of the importer, we present separate analyses of the 1994 and 1998 data as well
as separate analyses of developed versus developing importers. That this is important will
become clear below as we find that the effects of barriers can very substantially through
time, across stages of development, and by commodity type.
After a summary examination of barriers by country and by sector we present a formal
model of agricultural trade and how it is linked to trade barriers. The model we use is based
on the one developed in Haveman, Nair-Reichert, and Thursby (1999). That model allows
us to divide the effects of tariffs and each of four types of NTBs into three distinct effects:
(1) a reduction effect which is a lowering of overall trade due to the imposition of barriers,
(2) a compression effect which is a concentration of the source of imports into the largest
importers, and (3) a diversion effect which is a shift in trade patterns across exporters that
is related to differential barriers but is not related to exporter size. The richness of the
TRAINS data allows for separate estimation of each of these three effects for each of type
of barrier.
For completeness, we also examine the importance of distance between trading partners,
whether partners share a common border and whether partners share a common language.
Again, each of these effects is considered by sector, by year and by stage of development.
These are effects commonly included in the analysis of bilateral trade flows, such as this
one.
The order of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some of the previous
literature and in Section 3 we present a discussion of the TRAINS data with summary
statistics presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the formal model of trade and barriers
while Section 6 translates that model into an empirical specification appropriate for the
TRAINS data. Section 7 presents results and Section 8 concludes.
We consider 20 ~digit SIC agricultural and processed food sectors for each of the 34
3importers who appear in each TRAINS panel of data and for 67 exporters. We begin our
analysis with summary statistics on the incidence of tariffs and NTBs by importer and by
sector and how the incidence of barriers has changed over time.
2. Previous Literature
The empirical literature to date, for both manufactured and agricultural goods, has been
case studies of particular countries and/or particular commodities, or else the studies have
covered a large number of countries and commodities. The level of commodity aggregation
of this last set of studies has been such as to question whether important effects have been
masked. Case studies, while rich in detail, are difficult and time consuming to produce, hence
their number is limited making it hard to generalize about the overall level of world trade for
various commodity classifications. Non-case studies address issues regarding overall effects
on trade, but they are flawed by their reliance on higWy aggregated commodity groups.
Much of the empirical economics literature dealing with both tariffs and NTBs has
considered observations based solely on 3 or 4-digit aggregations. Agricultural commodities
are often included, but the level of aggregation provides for too few observations to allow for
regressions based solely on agricultural commodities. To the extent that effects of barriers
vary across sectors, they are masked when using higWy aggregated data. It is the extent of
the data as well as the level of disaggregation that largely differentiates our study from the
existing empirical literature.
Harrigan (1993), Trefler (1993), Leamer (1988, 1990) and Gawande (1995) are recent
examples of studies conducted at highly aggregated levels. Unfortunately, and perhaps due
to the level of aggregation, results are often conflicting. For example, Harrigan and Trefler
estimate the import reducing effects of trade barriers in developed countries using data from
1983. Harrigan's main conclusion is that tariff and transport costs were a more substantial
barrier to trade than were NTBs; he also reports significant heterogeneity across industries.
On the other hand, Trefler finds that, for the United States, NTBs do have a large, restrictive
impact on imports.
The agricultural economics literature has been varied in its attention to tariffs and NTBs.
Hillman (1996) discusses the evolution of attention to NTBs. Much of the current focus,
other than general theoretic treatises on NTBs in agricultural trade (see, for example, the
discussion of product standards in Barrett and Yang (1999)), has been on case studies. In
a result important to a goal of addressing differences in barriers by stage of development,
Johnson (1995) finds a distinction between developed and developing countries with respect
to the efficacy of technical barriers to trade. Bohman and Lindsey (1995a, 1995b) consider
issues regarding the interplay of environmental protection and trade liberalization. Garner
and Winton (1992) consider the effects of trade barriers on Australian exports to East
Asia. Moschini and Meilke (1991) study the conversion of import quotas into tariffs and its
impact on U.S.-Canada trade in chicken. Buckingham and Gray (1996) study the recent
requirements for end use certificates imposed by the United States and Canada for wheat
4imports from each other. DeRosa and Govindan (1995) deal with both trade liberalization
and regionalism. Roberts (1998) considers the WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. While not dealing with specific trade barriers, papers
by Gleckler, Koopman and Tweeten (1991) and Tweeten, Lin, Gleckler and Rask (1992) have
dealt with free trade within groups of countries.
3. Data
The 1994 and 1998 UNCTAD TRAINS data are inventories of bilateral tariffs, NTBs,
and trade flows for a large number of importers and exporters. To facilitate comparisons
through time it is necessary to limit our analysis to the 34 importers who appear in each of
the 1994 and 1998 databases. We further limit analysis to the 67 largest exporters and to
20 3-digit SIC agricultural sectors. A listing of countries and sectors is in Table 1.
The trade barrier data are present at the tariff line which is generally the 8 or 10-digit
HS level. The data include extensive information regarding tariffs and 80 different varieties
of NTBs. This information documents the preferential incidence of these barriers, including
MFN and GSP tariffs in addition to preferences arising from formal trade blocs.
Unlike the barrier data, trade flow data are only present at the 6-digit HS level; hence
analysis is limited to observations at this level. We consider 779 6-digit HS codes in the 20
sectors we examine. The number of HS codes covering each of the 20 sectors is found in
Table 1.2 Examples of 6-digit HS categories are natural honey, frozen boneless bovine meat,
rolled or flaked barley grains, blue-veined cheese, yogurt, peas (fresh or chilled) and dried
grapes.
The tariff for each 6-digit category is calculated as the simple average across all tariff
lines in that category. The UNCTAD data lists 80 NTB varieties that are aggregated into
four types on the basis of similarity in administrative structure and primary effects. Three
of the NTB categories depend on whether they have direct price effects (PRICE), quantity
restrictions (QUANT) or quality restrictions (QUAL). The final NTB category concerns
whether or not an import license is necessary (LICENSE).3 Some licenses are related to
quality issues and properly belong in QUAL while others serve to reduce import quantities
and properly belong in QUANT. For a particular license, it is unclear from the descriptions
provided by UNCTAD whether it belongs in QUAL or QUANT, hence, rather than impose
a somewhat arbitrary separation of licenses into those two categories (and possibly biasing
the QUAL and QUANT results), we simply include the category LICENSE. The measure
for each NTB imposed in each 6-digit HS category equals the fraction of the commodities
within the 6-digit category to which an NTB is applied; this fraction is 0% or 100% for more
2SIC 203 (preserved fruits and vegetables) covers more than the 92 codes noted in Table 1. Since our
regressions include a dummy variable for each HS code, we had to limit our study to 92 randomly selected
SIC 203 codes because of estimation difficulties with more than 92 codes.
3 Initially, we included advanced payment restrictions and the threats of retaliation as barrier categories.
However, there are so few of these that the (nonlinear) estimator generally could not provide coefficient
estimates.
5than 96% of the ~digit categories in 1994 and for more than 98% in 1998, thus our NTB
measures are, effectively, dummy variables for the presence of an NTB of a given type.
We drop from the sample any observation where a country does not import a good from
any other country. Dropping such observations may impart some bias to our estimates to
the extent that the failure to import is due to high trade barriers. However, including such
observations can also induce bias if the failure to import is unrelated to the barrier.
Before proceeding, a word of caution is necessary about the quality of the NTB data
as measures of trade barriers. First, it is our understanding from UNCTAD sources that
the definition of a barrier is quite loose: whether something is considered to be a barrier
is a matter of either the judgment of the UNCTAD staff or an exporter has reported some
importer's policy to be a barrier. This introduces the possibility of measurement error in
the NTB variables. Second, if an NTB is non-binding (for example, a quota where trade is
less than the quota), then this is a further source of measurement error. These concerns do
not extend to the tariff data.
For the 34 importers, 67 exporters, 2 years and 20 3-digit commodity groups covering
779 commodities we have 2,668,226 observations of which approximately 5% are non-zero
trade flows. In a later section we consider a formal empirical model of the impacts of trade
barriers on trade flows. For now we look simply at summary statistics on barriers aggregated
by country and by sector.
4. Summary Statistics
We turn first to results for individual countries and sectors. A unit of observation for our
calculations is a particular country's average weighted or unweighted tariff rates or NTB
coverage ratios for a particular sector. For brevity we report the detailed 1998 weighted
average tariffs and NTBs (these are found in Table 2), though the results underlying our
discussion are based on both years and simple as well as unweighted averages. One striking
feature is the number of country/sectors with no NTB protection: of the 640 country/sectors
we consider, 243 (38%) had no protection in 1994 and 280 (43.8%) had none in 1998. The
corresponding zero tariff rates are 93 (14.5%) in 1994 and 96 (15%) in 1998. FUrther, for
NTB covered sectors it is common to have more than half of all commodities in the sector
covered. For 1994, 56% of the covered sectors have coverage ratios greater than 50% while
for 1998 the comparable figure is 70%.
We note a slight increase in tariffs and a slight decrease in NTBs between 1994 and 1998.
Weighted average tariff rates rose by 1.4 percentage points from a 1994 value of 12.67 and
the simple average rose by 1.27 from its 1994 value of 15.8. Weighted average NTB coverage
ratios fell by 6.4 from the 1994 value of 39.5 while the unweighted average fell by 8.1 from
the 1994 value of 38.6. While the pattern of barrier coverage changed between 1994 and
1998, the aggregate figures suggest little overall change in barriers to agricultural trade.
In Table 3, we list for each year trade weighted (Wgt94 and Wtg98) and simple averages
(Smp94 and Smp98) of tariffs and NTB coverage ratios by country aggregated over industries
6as well as the changes between 1994 and 1998 in the trade weighted (DiffW) and simple
average (DiffS) barriers. In Table 4 we present those same measures by industry, aggregated
across countries. Each of Tables 3 and 4 give means, minimums and maximums by country
or industry by year.
Turning to the country aggregates in Table 3, one notes immediately the wide range in
both NTB coverage and tariff rates and changes between 1994 and 1998. NTB coverage
ratios range from 0% to nearly 100% while tariffs range from 0% to around 50% (with the
sole exception of Korea for whom the weighed average tariff in 1998 is 114%). Further, there
are a few countries with very large increases and a few with very large decreases in NTB
coverage ratios and tariff rates.
While not shown in the Table 3, we considered the relation between per capita income
and barriers. Interestingly, at any of the standard levels of significance, there is no signifi-
cant correlation between per capita income and the NTB simple or weighted coverage ratios;
however, for the simple and weighted tariff rates there are significant (at standard signifi-
cance levels) negative correlations with income of between -0.33 and -0.65. The implication
is that poorer countries are more likely to use tariff protection, while the use of non-tariff
protection bears no relation to income. We note that there is no significant correlation in
NTB or tariff changes and income level.
In Table 4 are industry or sector aggregates. We note substantial variation across sectors,
but the variation is less than the cross-country variation revealed in Table 4. As one goes
down the list of sectors in Table 4 from SIC 011 to SIC 209 a reasonable observation can be
made that the level of processing is generally increasing; that is, there is generally a greater
amount of processing prior to sale for the products in the higher numbered SIC codes than
in the lower numbered SIC codes. With that in mind we consider the relation between level
of processing and level of barriers by assigning numbers from 1 to 20 beginning with SIC
011. That is, we assign the number 1 to SIC 011, 2 to SIC 013 and so on to assignment of the
number 20 to SIC 209. This becomes a crude index of level of processing. We then compute
the simple correlation between our ad hoc index and the level of NTBs and tariffs as well
as changes in the levels. With regard to NTBs, the correlations with weighted and simple
average coverage ratios are all negative, but only one (simple average 1994) is significant at
a 10% level (-0.398). For tariffs there is a positive, significant correlation between simple
and weighted average tariffs in 1994 and the level of processing (0.7 and 0.668, respectively,
significant at the 1% level). Changes in weighted average tariffs are significantly negatively
associated with processing (-0.387, significant at the 10% level) so that the least processed
goods had the greatest fall in tariffs.
In Tables 5 and 6 are, respectively, country and sector NTB coverage ratios by each
of the four NTB types we consider in our sector regressions. Both weighted and simple
averages for each of 1994 and 1998 are presented. Note in Table 5 that PRlCE NTBs
are the least likely to be imposed and many fewer countries used LICENSE NTBs in 1998
than used them in 1994. We considered correlations of the coverage ratios in Table 6 with
our crude measure of processing. Processing is significantly and negatively correlated with
7simple average LICENSE coverage in 1994 (-0.48) and with QUAL in 1998 (-0.473). It is
also positively and significantly related to PRlCE in 1998 (0.432). There are no significant
correlation with the weighted average coverages.
5. A General Model of Trade Flows and Barriers
Simple economic theories of protection focus on markets with homogenous products and
do not include provisions for differential tariffs or NTBs imposed on the same good imported
from different countries. The predictions from these theories are well-known: the value and
volume of imports fall with the imposition of a tariff, while quantitative or qualitative restric-
tions lower the volume of imports but may raise or lower the value of imports depending on
the relevant domestic supply and demand elasticities. The homogeneous goods model may
be appropriate for much of agricultural trade, but a monopolistically competitive model,
wherein goods are differentiated, is appropriate for at least some agricultural trade.4 The
model we choose to estimate is appropriate for either homogeneous or differentiated goods.
In earlier work (Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby (1999)) we developed an estimable
trade model which allows for either homogeneous or differentiated goods and applied the
model to imports by 15 developed countries for a single time period (1994). The interested
reader is directed to that paper for an in-depth consideration of the model. Here we simply
outline the salient features of that model and present the empirical specification. In our
earlier model we derived the bilateral trade between countries i and j for commodity k as
where
[(Pk k)-P] (p~t~.)l-uMJ:;. = i Ii ~ kr:y. J lJ
lJ r~ °l 'YJ l J pk
l l
(5.1)
-Lrf = ((Pik,f)l-P+ (pt*)l-P) l-p
is a price index covering domestic and foreign varieties (and essentially modifies the con-
sumption share parameter so as to incorporate substitutions between home and foreign
varieties)
and Pik = L 'Y~Yi(P~tnl-U
I
is a price index over imported varieties and Pik* is a price index over domestically provided
varieties. pj is j's price for commodity k, tfj is an exporter-specific tariff, of is the share
of good k in country i consumption, 'Yj is k's production share in country j, Yi and Yj are
the incomes of trading partners i and j, u is the elasticity of substitution between foreign
varieties, and If is country i's average tariff on commodity k..
Accordingly, imports from country j are a function of country i's average tariff, If, and
bilateral tariffs, tfj' Alternatively, we could redefine pj to incorporate the average tariff, at
which point tt is equal to the deviation of the tariff faced by country j from the average.
This model captures the notion that a uniform tariff will lead to a uniform contraction
4See, for example, Thursby, Johnson, and Grennes (1986) wherein the world wheat market is analyzed as
a differentiated goods market. See also Thursby and Thursby (1990).
8of trade from each exporter (the reduction effect) while the impact of preferential tariff
reductions will lead to a reshuffiing of imports across exporters (the diversion effect) as well
as a reduction effect.
An additional effect that is not incorporated in equation (5.1) arises from the presence
of fixed costs of trading; for example, there could be costs associated with establishing and
maintaining lines of supply and means of transport. One way in which these costs could
manifest themselves is in a fixed cost of trading with additional countries. The sensible
introduction of the notion of fixed costs to trade requires the presence of both product
differentiation and love of variety since the absence of either characteristic makes the impli-
cation of country-specific fixed costs trivial. That is, without varieties,' the size of the tariff
determines the quantity imported and imports are purchased from the smallest possible
number of countries; note that this describes the equilibrium even with a zero tariff.
The presence of fixed costs results in a compression of trade into the largest potential ex-
porters of the commodity, and compression becomes more severe the larger the tariff. The
intuition is simply that a larger tariff effectively reduces the consumer's expenditures on
imported commodities. Holding the number of countries fixed while reducing expenditures
implies that fixed costs are an increasing fraction of the value of imports. In the limit, this
fraction can exceed the expenditure allocated to imported varieties and their consumption
ceases. Along the way to this limit, if the fixed cost is uniform across countries, the contrac-
tion of imports results in a disproportionately high share of expenditures on varieties from
small exporters going towards the fixed cost. Hence, imports from smaller suppliers will
be dropped first. Dropping one exporter frees up the previously incurred fixed cost, which
serves to increase purchases from the larger exporters, perhaps in excess of the no-tariff
value.
In sum, both the presence of preferential tariffs and fixed costs can influence bilateral
trade patterns. Preferential tariffs concentrate imports in low tariff countries (the diversion
effect), while fixed costs of trading concentrate trade in the hands of a small number of large
suppliers (the compression effect). These two effects are then combined with the reduction
effect to provide for the three distinct barrier effects noted in the introduction.
Until now, we have said little about the effects of NTBs. In some studies (see, for exam-
ple, Leamer (1990)), tor T represent generic barriers to trade rather than tariffs specifically.
The impact of an NTB is presumed to be qualitatively identical to that of a tariff. Indeed,
in Leamer's analysis of NTBs, he finds anomalous the result that NTBs increase the value
of trade. It is possible, however, that NTBs raise price to a greater extent than they lower
quantity, thus raising the value of the bilateral trade flow. Nonetheless, we also interpret
t and T broadly as any barrier to free trade. At the same time, however, we expect there
to be instances where the imposition of an NTB serves to raise the value of imports, or the
preferential absence of an NTB lowers the value of imports from unencumbered exporters;




Our empirical specification is based on equation (5.1) wherein we consider a regression
of bilateral trade flows on determinants of those flows. The specific form of our estimating
equation is based on the logarithm of equation (5.1):
In Mi~ = - pIn rf + (1 - 0-) In tfj
+ In of + In 'Y~ + In Yi + In Yj
+(1 - 0-) InpJ -lnrf - plnpr
Each of the right hand side variables can be replaced by constructed tariff and NTB variables
or an appropriate set of dummy variables.
Trade Flow Data: A trade flow observation, Mi~' is the dollar value of bilateral imports
for individual country pairs i and j for a particular 6-digit HS code k. For the majority
of country pairs the trade flow is zero, thus we augment the observed positive flow data
with zero flow observations. As some zero observations are the result of trade barriers,
the inclusion of zero flow observations avoids bias and inconsistency induced when such
observations are omitted from the sample. We do not, however, include zero observations
when the exporter does not export this good to any country, or the importer does not import
the good from any country. We recognize that such omissions may introduce error into our
regressions if the failure to export or import is due to barriers. However, the lack of trade
may also be due to a small (or zero) scale of production or level of consumption; in such
cases, the inclusion of zero observations can lead to error. Our prior is that the latter
phenomenon is more pervasive and hence the omission of these observations is appropriate.
Trade Barrier Data: The first line in equation (6.1) implies a pair of trade barrier
variables: the average barrier imposed against all exporters and an exporter-specific term
that incorporates trade preferences. The first of these we denote as a trade reduction effect,
rf, and the second as a trade diversion effect, tfj' As noted above, these effects can result
from NTBs as well as tariffs, hence we incorporate in our regression both NTB and tariff
effects. Earlier we noted that we consider four different types of NTB barriers (PRlCE,
QUANT, QUAL and LICENSE). Thus, we estimate separate effects for each of four NTB
types, in addition to those for tariffs.
The trade reducing effect of tariffs, hereafter T ARf, is calculated as a trade weighted
average of the bilateral tariffs imposed by country i in HS category k. This variable
reflects changes in a price index of imported varieties relative to the domestic price level,
and an increase will reduce imports as consumers substitute domestic for foreign varieties.
The weights are country exports at the 5-digit HS level; this weighting scheme is chosen to
reduce the bias due to simultaneity that would result from using 6-digit imports as weights.
The tariff diversion effect, T ARDivt, reflects variability in the applied tariffs across
countries and captures the extent to which preferential tariffs lead to diversion from one
variety of the good (defined by country of origin) to another. We calculate this variable for
each exporter as the difference between the tariff it faces and the average tariff faced by all
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other exporters. The effect is expected to be negative: a high relative tariff diverts trade
away from a particular exporter.
For each of the four NTB types the reduction effect, NTBft, is a trade weighted (using
exports at the 5-digit HS level) NTB coverage ratio for NTB type l imposed by country
i on commodity k. Although higher tariffs lower both the volume and value of trade, an
NTB can increase or decrease the value of trade, depending on domestic elasticities. Hence,
the sign of the coefficient on the NTBft regressors is dependent on these elasticities and we
anticipate both positive and negative coefficients for this effect; negative when the quantity
effect dominates the price effect and positive otherwise. The diversion effect, NTBDivtl'
indicates the extent to which an NTB diverts trade from exporters facing the NTB towards
unencumbered exporters. This variable is positive and equal to the proportion of countries
covered by the NTB for exporters exempt from the NTB, and it is negative and equal to
the proportion of countries exempt from coverage for constrained exporters. Hence, positive
values for this variable indicate relative advantage while negative values indicate relative
disadvantage; our prior is that advantaged countries will experience an increase in bilateral
trade and hence the coefficient will be positive.
While not explicit in the above model, there is a third effect of barriers that arises
from the presence of fixed costs. AB noted earlier, fixed costs can lead to a compression of
trade into fewer partners than would be observed in the absence of barriers. We expect the
existence of these fixed costs to increase the extent to which countries import from large
potential suppliers by diverting trade away from smaller suppliers (or, alternatively, we
expect a disproportionately smaller tariff reduction effect in the case of exporters who are
larger than the average). The tariff compression effect is measured by TARCompfj which is
the product ofTARf and the exporter's export potential, measured as that country's exports
at the 3-digit SIC level. Note that the raw coefficient on T ARf must now be modified if
it is to maintain its original interpretation. That is, the compression effect operating on a
country with the mean exporter potential must be added onto the raw T ARf coefficient; this
correction is made throughout the results section. The reported coefficient on TARCompfj
is then the change in the trade compression effect that results from differences in size across
exporters. The NTB compression effect, NTBCompfjl' is similarly defined. If fixed costs
are important so that compression occurs in the presence of barriers, the coefficients of the
compression terms will be positive.
Finally, we include what we call the NTB mitigating effects of a tariff which arises
from the coincident application of a tariff and an NTB. The variable capturing this effect,
T ARf .NTBft, is expected to have an effect opposite in sign from the coefficient estimate on
the NTB variable. The imposition of a tariff lowers the value of trade, and the imposition
of an NTB in the same industry can raise or lower the value of trade in the absence of a
tariff. In the event that both a tariff and an NTB are applied in a perfectly competitive
industry, the effect would mirror that of the tariff, lowering the value of trade relative to
that resulting from the lone application of an NTB.
Commodity Dummy Variables: Though we include only related commodities within
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each regression, there may still remain some commodity specific effects. In particular, with
identical preferences, af will be the same across importers and have only cross-industry
variability. Hence we include a separate dummy variable for each 6-digit HS good to mitigate
the potential for bias that may arise from differences across disaggregated industries.
Importer and Exporter Dummy Variables: The use of country dummy variables elim-
inates country-specific effects. These effects are most clearly evident in the second line of
equation (6.1) via importer and exporter incomes Yi and Yj and exporter specific effects aris-
ing from "Yj I the production share parameter. Under the assumption that the HS categories
included in each regression are sufficiently comparable, 'Yj varies only across countries and
not across goods. The exporter dummy variables therefore capture differences in production
levels across countries.5 Note that by including importer dummies, we also control for the
effects of differences in the share of the importing country in total world spending.
Country Pair and Other Effects: There is little question that various relationships, quite
apart from economic differences, between countries can influence trade between country
pairs. Rather than attempt to incorporate country pair dummies, we have included some of
the more popular measures from the gravity equation literature, to which our framework is
clearly related. Country pair characteristics include the distance between major economic
centers in the two countries (DISTANCEij ), whether or not a common land border is
shared (BORDEI4j), and whether or not a common language is spoken (LANGij ). Note
that LANGij can pick up (in addition to an ease in conversing with one's importers or
exporters) common food preferences as one might expect common languages to also imply
common cultural heritages. Finally, the last line of equation (6.1) includes terms that fold
into a constant. The rf term, assuming competitive price responses by domestic producers,
takes on the value of 2, and pj is constant if world prices of imported varieties are assumed
equal to one another.6
Our estimating equation takes the form
In(Mi~) = {3o + 6jEj + WiMi + KkHk (6.2)
+{31DISTANCEij + {32BORDEI4j + {33LANGij
+61 ln(TARf) + 62 1n(TARDivt) + 63 1n(TARCompfj)
+ L [xnNTBfL + Xl2NTBDivtl + XI3NTBCompft]
I
+L Xl4T ARf .NTBfL
I
where the first line includes a constant, exporter (E), importer (M) and commodity (H)
and the second line contains the country pair effects. Tariff variables are on the third
line and reflect reduction, diversion and compression effects, respectively. The fourth line
SIt could be argued that the explicit inclusion of production would be more appropriate. Not only is it
infeasible to include production levels, but it might equally well be argued that the differences in production
levels are attributable to differences in factor endowments, in which case our dummy variable approach
provides sufficient control variables.
6 Alternative assumptions merely place these terms in the importer and exporter dummies.
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includes the NTB variables, where l runs over NTB types PRICE, QUANT, QUAL and
LICENSE. For each type of NTB, there are variables designed to reflect reduction, diversion
and compression effects. The terms in the last line are interactions of NTB and tariff
variables.
With trade and barrier data on each of 34 importers and 67 exporters for 779 com-
modities, we can consider this regression for narrowly defined agricultural and processed
food categories. Separate regressions are performed for each of the 20 3-digit SIC categories
considered earlier, as well as for each of the two years of data (1994 and 1998) as well as for
two groups of importers divided according to stage of development. The importers included
in the developed countries and developing countries regressions are given in Table 1. Thus,
80 regressions are considered and each regression includes observations on bilateral trade
at the 6-digit level spanned by a particular 3-digit SIC group, for a particular year and for
either the developed or developing importers in our sample. The number of observations
per regressions model varies from a low of 1114 to a high of 76,009 with an average of 33,353
observations per regression.
Econometric problems: Since the dataset contains a large number of zero values for the
dependent variable we use a standard Tobit estimator. Further, the existence of simultane-
ous equation bias in a framework such as ours has been widely discussed. In our regression
the potential for simultaneity arises from two sources. First, there is the endogenous protec-
tion argument that, while protection is directed at reducing imports, high levels of imports
are a cause of protection. Note, however, that barriers are imposed prior (often, years prior)
to the observations on flows. A past trade Bow may be the cause of a barrier, but current
flows cannot cause the imposition of a barrier in the past. Second, the use of trade flows
to construct average levels of barriers to be used as explanatory variables can introduce
simultaneity. In our calculations we use exports at the 5-digit level to weight tariff variables
at the 6-digit level. As such, trade weighting as a source of bias and inconsistency is reduced
as the left hand side of the regression is only a small part of the trade weight on the right
hand side.
7. Results
Excluding the dummy variables, there are 22 coefficients for each of 80 regressions (20
sectors by 2 years by 2 stages of development). In what follows we present reduction,
diversion and compressions effects for tariffs, but for NTBs we present only reduction and
compression effects. NTB diversion effects are omitted because the nonlinear estimator was
unable to provide many of these effects. Only about a third of the NTB diversion effects
could be estimated, and, of these, less than 20% are significant at a 5% level.
Further, the cross effects (TARf' NTBh) are not discussed because few are significantly
different from zero. Only about 6% of the cross effects are significant at a 5% level; consider
that, if the true coefficients are zero, a 5% test on average will reveal significance in 5% of
cases. We interpret these results to suggest that there are no coincident effects from the
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imposition of multiple barriers. We find this result to be surprising and at odds with the
findings in Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby (1999) for manufacturing sectors in 1994
for a set of developed countries. The implication is that, for agricultural commodities, tariffs
do not have mitigating effects on NTBs and visa versa.
Wherever possible we compute elasticities. Table 7 contains the tariff reduction, diver-
sion and compression elasticities. Tables 8 and 9 contain the NTB reduction and compression
effects and Table 10 holds the country pairs effects (DISTANCE, BORDER and LANG).
In what follows we reference a number of tests for significant differences in sector elastici-
ties across time and stage of development, however, for brevity, we do not present the test
statistics.
An important focus of our discussions will be on how barrier effects have changed over
time and on how the effects of barriers depend on the stage of development of the importer.
Further, we noted earlier that the amount of processing involved in bringing a commodity to
market generally increases as the SIC code increases and we used a crude measure of the level
of processing that is simply a count from 1 to 20 with 1 assigned to the smallest SIC code (SIC
011), 2 assigned to the next smallest code (SIC 013), and so on. To simplify our discussion
of time, stage of development and level of processing we regress estimated coefficients on
our measure of processing and dummy variables for year and stage of development as well as
an interaction term between year and stage of development. These regressions are found in
Table 11. YR94 is a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1994 and zero if the year is
1998. DEVELOP is a dummy equal to one if the importer is a developed country and equal
to zero if not. PROCESS is our measure of processing and YR94DEV is the product of YR94
and DEVELOP.7 8 To avoid confusion in discussions of regression results we refer to these
regressions as the auxiliary regressions to differentiate them from the primary regression
results (i.e., results from estimation of equation (6.2)).
The R2 ,s are similar across the 80 regressions of equation (6.2). They range from a low
of 0.22 to a high of 0.40 with an average of 0.27. Ninety percent are between 0.22 and 0.34.
There is no discernible pattern of R2,s by time, stage of development or stage of processing.
Tariff Reduction Effects: Tariff reduction effects are found in columns 2-5 of table 7.
We have generally the expected result of negative elasticities; 50 of the 80 coefficients are
negative and significantly different from zero while only 4 are positive and significant.9 In
general, the elasticities are quite large. Almost 70% of the negative elasticities are larger
than 5 in absolute value. Consider, for example, SIC 017, fruits and tree nuts, which has
7Note that this regression is mathematically equivalent to a regression with regressors that, in addition
to PROCESS, are dummy variables indicating whether the dependent variable is from a particular year and
group of importers. The form we use allows more easily for testing whether there are different year and stage
of development effects.
8The variances of the dependent variables are different so that, as is standard in such regressions as
these, we use weighted least squares with weights equal to the standard errors estimated from the trade flow
regressions.
9For SIC 81, timber tracts, there appears to be some sort of problem with our estimation as the 1994,
developed coefficient is 108.25 and significant. We are unsure as to the source of this problem.
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elasticities ranging from -4.6 to -12.84; the implication is that a 1% increase in tariffs in this
sector would lead to somewhere between a 4.6% and 12.84% decrease in trade in addition
to any diverting and compressing effects of the tariff.
For developed countries there appears to be a reduction in the magnitude of elasticities
between 1994 and 1998. Considering only the negative elasticities, the average changes from
around -18.5 to around -9.3 between 1994 and 1998. We tested for differences in elasticities
across years for both developed and developing countries. That is, we tested for each sector
whether there is a difference in the 1994 and 1998 elasticities. For developed countries, 11
of the 20 test statistics are significantly different from zero at the 5% level and 8 of these
11 show reductions in the effects of tariffs.
Developing country elasticities are generally smaller than those for developed countries
(though they are still fairly large) and there is much less of a change in elasticities across
time. The average negative elasticity in 1994 is -5.4 while for 1998 it is -7.0. Eight of the
20 tests for differences in elasticities over time for developing countries are significant at the
5% level, and half of these tests show a decline in elasticity and half an increase.
We also tested for differences in the sector elasticities according to stage of development.
That is, for each sector and each year, we tested for a difference between the developed
and developing country elasticities. For 1994, 12 of the 20 differences in elasticities are
significant at the 5% level and, in all but two, the developing country elasticity is smaller
in magnitude than is its developed country counterpart. For 1998, there is substantially
greater similarity in elasticities with only 5 differences significantly different from zero and
3 of these show smaller elasticity magnitudes for developing countries.
We find it odd that the reduction effects of tariffs for developed countries are becoming
more in line with those of developing countries, rather than the other way around. It is
possible that the mix of tariffs within sectors has shifted in developed countries in such a
way that the size of the reduction effect has fallen over time.
The first column of Table 11 reports the results of the auxiliary regression of the elastic-
ities reported in Table 7 on the year and development dummies (YR94 and DEVELOP) as
well as their interaction (YR94DEV) and the processing measure (PROCESS). Only the in-
teraction and constant terms are significant. This suggests that the 1994 developed country
elasticities; are larger than are the others. Incidentally, dropping SIC 081 with its apparent
outliers does not materially affect the results.
Tariff Diversion Effects: Recall that our tariff diversion measure is defined in such a way
that a negative coefficient implies diversion toward exporters least affected by a tariff, and
this effect is expected. Columns 6-9 of Table 7 report the tariff diversion elasticities that are
generally negative and significant, and often quite large. Consider, for example, SIC 202,
dairy products, which has elasticities ranging from -0.39 to -25.11; the implication is that a
1% unilateral increase in tariffs against some country in this sector would lead to somewhere
between a 0.39% and 25.11% diversion of its trade to other exporters. Forty-eight of the
80 estimated elasticities are significantly different from zero and nearly 90% of these are
negative. The average negative, significant elasticity is -14.6; this compares with an average
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negative, significant elasticity for the reduction effect of -11.5. It would appear from our
results that the trade diverting effects of tariffs (net of any compressing effect) are similar
in magnitude to trade reducing effects, though perhaps they are slightly greater.
Across time the elasticities fall in magnitude; in developing countries the average negative
elasticity falls from -11.5 to only -2.5 while for developed countries the average negative
elasticity falls from -24.3 to -19.4. Eight of the developing country differences in diversion
elasticities are significant at a 5% level and all of their changes imply a decreasing magnitude
of effects. Nine of the developed country time differences are significant at a 5% level and
4 show decreasing magnitude of effects.
Turning to the auxiliary regression results in Table 11 we find a result similar to the tariff
reduction result; the 1994 developed country results tend to be different from the others.
The auxiliary regression results do not change materially if the outliers (SIC 021, SIC 025
and SIC 081) are dropped from the regression. Note that the auxiliary regression R2 for
the diversion effect is substantially smaller than the reduction R2 (0.26 versus 0.61).
Tariff Compression Effects: Recall that a positive tariff compression effect indicates that
fixed costs are such that increases in multilateral tariffs lead to compression of trade towards
larger trading partners. That is, in the presence of fixed costs and for homogeneous goods, in
particular, smaller exporters generally bear more of the brunt of higher tariffs than do larger
exporters. Of the 80 estimated compression effects, 41 are significantly different from zero
and 26 of these are positive. There is slight evidence of compression toward larger partners.
Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby (1999), on the other hand, find substantial evidence
of compression toward larger partners in their examination of manufacturing sectors for a
set of developed countries in 1994. Overall, the evidence for compression effects appears to
be more modest than for reduction and diversion effects. This is not entirely surprising,
as these goods are relatively homegoneous. Importers may buy from a small number of
countries in the absence of barriers. The imposition of a barrier would then have little room
to compress trade.
In testing for significant differences across time, only 10 of the 40 tests show a significant
difference (5% level) between 1994 and 1998; however, for each of the significant differences,
the movement is to increased compression toward larger partners over time. The auxiliary
regression results in Table 11 also suggest increased compression over time. Turning to
differences according to stage of development, 14 of the 40 tests have significant statistics.
In only one of these 14 significant differences is there greater compression for developing
countries. The auxiliary regression also shows more compression for developed countries.
We calculated the simple correlations across the three tariff effects. Only the tariff
reduction and diversion effects are significantly correlated (significant at the 1% level). The
correlation is 0.551 suggesting that sectors in which tariffs reduce overall trade substantially
are also sectors in which those tariffs are shifting trade substantially across exporters. The
alternative effect, which is not supported by the data, is that tariffs that do not reduce trade
overall would be tariffs that manifest themselves in diverting trade; below we find this effect
for NTBs.
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NTB.Reduction Effects: In Table 8 are the NTB reduction effects. There is little pattern
to these effects. Around 40% are significantly different from zero (at standard significance
levels) and around 60% of these are positive. Recall that, unlike tariff reduction effects
which are expected to be (and generally are) negative, NTB reduction effects do not have
an expected sign. Slightly more of the developing country effects are negative than are the
developed country effects, and there are more negative effects in 1994 than in 1998.
Our results show an extreme sensitivity of trade to NTBs. Consider that a value of the
reduction effect of 1.0 implies that trade is about 70% larger in the presence of an NTB
while a value of -1.0 implies that trade falls by about 63% in the presence of an NTB.
Though many of the estimated NTB reduction effects are not significantly different from
zero at standard levels, those that are different from zero suggest a greater sensitivity of
trade to NTBs than to tariffs. The greater sensitivity to NTBs may well follow from the
fact that tariffs are more often applied uniformly than are NTBs, hence, the presence of a
tariff allows for fewer options in alternative sources of the good.
The auxiliary regression results in Table 11 show no significant time or development
stage effects. Note also that the auxiliary regression R2's are very small; this stands in
sharp contrast to the tariff reduction auxiliary regression. Examining the tests for significant
differences in the estimated effects by stage of development, we find around 45% of the effects
are significantly different (at a 5% level) between developed and developing countries. Only
about 35% of the tests for changes in NTB reduction effects over time are significantly
different from zero.
Turning to a comparison of the effects of various types of NTBs we continue to find little
in the way of patterns. QUAL NTBs tend more often than the others to have significant
effects and for the effects to be positive. To the extent that the QUAL NTBs indeed improve
the quality of imported goods, it is not surprising that QUAL would have positive effects:
higher quality goods generally have higher prices, hence there is a greater likelihood that
the price effects would outweigh the lower quantity effects of the NTBs so that the value of
trade would increase. There is also some tendency for this same sort of effect for the PRICE
NTBs; again, this positive effect is not surprising.
Finally, there are no significant correlations among the reduction effects of the four
different types of NTBs. We computed the simple correlations of the tariff reduction effects
with the four NTB reduction effects. These correlations are not particularly revealing.
Only the tariff and LICENSE effects are significantly correlated (0.387, significant at the
1% level).
NTB Compression Effects: NTB compression effects are found in Table 9. As is the
case with the NTB reduction effects, there is little pattern here. Approximately half of the
compression effects are positive (regardless of whether significant). Only 30% are signifi-
cantly different from zero. NTB compression effects are generally quite large though they
are substantially smaller than are the NTB reduction effects. They are, however, quite a
bit larger than are the tariff compression effects.
Examining the figures in Table 9 and the auxiliary regression results in Table 11 as well
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as the tests of significant differences in effects across time and stage of development, the
only pattern is that the developing countries are more likely to have a positive compression
effect. That is, developing countries are more likely to compress trade toward their larger
importers in the presence of price NTBsj this result is in contrast to the tariff compression
effects.
We calculated the correlations among the NTB compression effects and found a signif-
icant correlation only between PRlCE and LICENSE (-0.513, significant at the 1% level).
We also computed the correlations across each NTB's reduction and compression effects.
For these four comparisons, two are not significant at standard levels and two are significant
at the 1% level. PRlCE reduction and compression are negatively correlated (-0.69) as are
QUANT reduction and compression (-.498). The implication is that, the higher the reduc-
tion effect, the lower the compression effect. This is a reasonable finding. If a barrier does
not lower overall trade by much, it nonetheless leads to a greater shifting of trade across
importers. Note that this is different from the tariff effects; tariff reduction effects are pos-
itively correlated with tariff diversion effects. Finally, we calculated the correlation of the
tariff and NTB compression effects. The only significant correlations (at the 10% level) are
between tariff compression effects and QUANT and QUAL compression effects. However,
the correlations are only around 0.2, suggesting that there is not much information in these
correlations.
Distance Effects: The elasticities of trade to distance between trading partners (DIS-
TANCE) are found in the columns 2-5 of Table 10. In each regression, the coefficient of
distance is negative and significant at the 1% level. A one percent increase in distance leads
to a drop in trade from around 2% to as much as 5%. The negative effect is, of course,
expected, but what is somewhat surprising is the similarity in the size of effects for a given
year and level of development - that is, the coefficients in each of the DISTANCE columns
are quite similar in size. Note also the very high R2 reported in Table 11 for the DISTANCE
auxiliary regression.
From the raw coefficients, there appears to be a small decrease in the importance of
distance between 1994 and 1998; that is, if one compares a given SIC sector's DISTANCE
coefficient in 1994 with its 1998 counterpart, there is generally a decrease in the coefficients,
this can also be seen in the mean DISTANCE coefficients (-2.712 for 1994 developed versus
-2.551 for 1998 developed, and -3.825 for 1998 developing versus -3.532 for 1998 developing).
However, few of the test statistics we calculated for differences over time in the coefficients
are significant; out of 40 comparisons (20 sectors for developed countries and 20 sectors for
developing countries) only 7 are significantly different from zero at a 5% level. These results
are corroborated by the auxiliary regression results in Table 11; that is, the coefficient of
YR94 is not significantly different from zero.
We do find, however, a significant difference in the effects of distance by level of develop-
ment - distance between trading partners is of greater importance for developing countries.
We compared the 20 DISTANCE coefficients of developed countries with the 20 DISTANCE
coefficients for the developing countries for each of the two years (that is, 40 test statistics
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were computed); only 6 of the tests were not significantly different from zero at a 5% level.
Further, there is only one case (SIC 083 in 1994) in which the DISTANCE coefficient for
developing is significantly smaller in magnitude than the developed coefficient. This result
is corroborated by our auxiliary regression results reported in Table 11; that is, there is a
positive and significant coefficient of DEVELOP.
There appears to be a general decrease in the magnitudes of the distance coefficient
as one moves down the table for any of the four DISTANCE columns. Considering the
regression results in Table 11 we note that there is a significant decrease in the importance
of distance as the level of processing increases.
Common Border Effects: Columns 6-9 of Table 10 report the coefficients associated with
whether or not the trading partners share a common border (BORDER). The coefficients
are generally significant and are, as expected, positive whenever significant. As is the
case with the DISTANCE coefficients, there appears from the coefficients to be generally a
reduction in the importance of a common border over time; however, these time differences
are significantly different from zero in only five of the 40 tests (using a 5% significance level).
The results reported in Table 11 further support this, finding no relation between BORDER
and time. lO
Comparing coefficients according to level of development, sharing a common border
appears to be more important for developing countries. Thirteen of the 40 test statistics are
significantly different from zero and in only one of these (SIC 207 for 1994) is the developed
coefficient larger than the developing coefficient. The results in Table 11 suggest that,
holding constant the year and level of processing, the effects of sharing a common border
are about 0.66 smaller for developed countries. Those results also show a significant fall in
the importance of sharing a common border and the level of processing.
Common Language Effects: The final columns of Table 10 report the coefficients asso-
ciated with having a common language (LANG). The coefficients are generally positive (as
expected) and significant. In only one case (SIC 205, 1994, developing) is the coefficient
negative and significant (at the 10% level). From the raw coefficients there appears to be
a general increase in the importance of having a common language over time; however,
only six of the 40 comparisons show a significant difference over time and each of these
six significant differences is for an increase in the importance of a common language and
each occurs for developing countries. However, the auxiliary regression results suggest that,
holding constant the level of development, there is a significant increase over time in the
importance of having a common language.
Comparing coefficients across level of development, 11 of the 40 comparisons are signif-
icantly different from zero (5% level) and 8 of these show a greater importance of common
language for the developing countries. This is corroborated by the auxiliary regression
results.
IOGiven that the coefficients of both measures of "distance" (DISTANCE and BORDER) show declining
importance over time, one might conjecture that the rate of decline in importance is so slow that a 4 year
difference fails to show a significant difference, but a longer time period might reveal declining importance.
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8. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented and estimated a model of international trade in agricul-
tural commodities that separately estimates the trade effects of tariff as well as four types
of NTBs. The model also accommodates the separation of barrier effects into three types:
(1) a reduction efJed which is a lowering of overall trade due to the imposition of barriers,
(2) a compression effect which is a concentration of the source of imports into the largest
importers, and (3) a diversion effect which is a shift in trade patterns across exporters that
is related to differential barriers but is not related to exporter size. It is the richness of
the data found in the UNCTAD TRAINS data that allows for this detailed look at barriers
imposed in 20 3-digit SIC sectors for the years 1994 and 1998 and by stage of development
of the importer.
Our primary results are:
• While the pattern of barrier coverage changed between 1994 and 1998, the overall
levels of barriers did not change much.
• Lower income countries appear more likely to use tariff protection, but there appears
to be no correlation between income and NTBs.
• There are some clear differences over time and stage of development for the tariff
effects. This does not appear to hold for most of the NTB effects.
• Tariff reduction and diversion effects are large, but there is only slight evidence of
tariff compression.
• NTB reduction effects are very large and are greater than tariff reduction effects.
• NTB compression effects are mixed, but there appears to be more of a compressing
effect when the importer is a developing country.
• We could find no evidence of tariff mitigating effects of NTBs (that is, the cross effects
appear to be zero).
• There are significant differences in the country pair effects (distance, sharing a common
border and sharing a common language) over time and by stage of development.
• There is some (albeit weak) evidence of declining importance over time of the distance
variables (distance between major trading centers and sharing a common border).
• The level of processing involved in the commodity is related to each of the country
pair effects. Further, the least processed foods appear to have had the greatest fall
in tariffs. There is also some evidence that the NTB coverage ratios are negatively
related to the level of processing.
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Table 1. Importers, Exporters and Agricultural Sectors
Importers: Developed Countries
Australia Taiwan Hong Kong












































Finland Japan Norway South Africa Turkey
France Kenya Oman Saudia Arbia U.S.
Gennany KoreaRP Pakistan Singapor United Kingdon
Greece Malaysia Panama Spain Uruguay
Hong Kong Mexico Paraguay Sri Lanka Venzuela
Hungary Morocco Peru Sweden Yugoslavia
India Nepal Philippines Switzerland Taiwan
Indonsia Netherlands Poland Thailand
Ireland New Zealand Portugal Trinidad























Field Crops. Exc. Cash Grains
Vegetables and Melons
Fruits and Tree Nuts
Horticultural Specialties








Preserved Fruits and Vegetables
Grain Mill Products
Bakery Products
Sugar and Confectionery Products
Fats and Oils
Beverages
Misc. Food and Kindred Products





















Table 2. Trade Weighted Average Barriers, 1998
Weighted Average Tariffs
Industry
011 013 016 017 018 021 01S 027 081 08J 091 :WI 102 203 204 %OS 206 207 208 209
ArgcDlina 1.9 1.3 4.7 5.4 4.7 1.9 1.1 6.0 1.0 4.5 9.4 3.1 11.6 10.8 8.9 10.6 9.6 6.9 14.1 12.0
Australia 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 2.7 3.3 0.6 3.6 3.5 0.5 4.2 2.6
Bolivia 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.9 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Brazil 5.8 6.9 5.1 9.8 3.2 1.8 1.3 10.5 8.0 4.2 10.7 9.4 15.6 13.3 10.3 18.0 17.9 9.7 16.9 9.4
CaDada 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 2.5 2.1 1.4 0.5 1.4 2.0 0.4 1.6 1.6
Chile 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
China 109.3 3.5 13.7 22.0 2.2 14.6 5.5 16.8 23.0 24.2 21.5 8.9 15.7 29.6 59.8 25.0 28.6 48.5 48.5 26.3
Colombia 11.9 9.9 15.0 14.9 6.9 8.1 8.1 7.0 10.0 5.5 18.4 15.1 16.5 16.5 18.0 0.0 18.0 16.7 13.8 17.6
Czchslvk 18.6 5.3 9.0 4.4 6.1 0.2 11.8 \.2 4.6 0.0 0.4 9.0 8.2 6.0 9.8 9.0 10.9 2.2 16.4 6.1
Ecuador 7.1 5.2 15.0 15.0 0.7 2.0 6.5 9.0 0.0 5.4 13.9 10.2 14.8 15.3 15.7 0.0 15.7 14.5 16.1 13.8
Europe 1.0 0.7 8.1 6.0 9.8 0.3 10.6 5.0 5.8 0.1 8.0 4.4 11.1 13.9 4:5 0.0 6.7 1.1 11.6 9.9
Hong Kong 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 32.1 35.7 42.7 25.7 23.8 7.3 33.5 22.3 22.1 4.1 8.4 25.6 36.1 40.7 25.7 36.8 33.4 2.8 63.6 31.3
India 8.1 1.3 10.0 28.3 10.1 20.0 0.0 29.8 0.0 22.9 7.8 1.3 15.9 48.2 17.0 40.0 45.7 29.8 218.6 51.3
Japan 33.0 0.7 6.9 4.7 2.4 0.2 2.9 4.1 \.9 1.1 6.2 19.5 25.6 16.1 5.8 2\.8 16.5 1.5 21.4 I\.6
KoreaRP 340.3 124.0 145.6 36.9 46.3 6.0 16.5 I\.4 8.0 13.3 13.4 18.0 57.6 54.2 87.8 8.0 24.8 6.1 67.0 51.6
Malaysia 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.5 \.0 2.6 7.7 0.3 13.6 3.8 0.8 22.1 8.0
Mexico 1.3 4.7 10.0 31.5 0.9 0.4 19.7 13.4 20.0 0.7 19.7 7.7 52.5 18.6 11.8 10.0 15.9 11.5 16.5 17.7
New Zea1and 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.2 1.1 1.4 \.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.9 1.1
Norway 0.0 0.1 2.2 0.0 68.1 0.0 353.1 0.0 16.2 1.3 0.0 0.1 7.6 3.9 25.8 0.0 3.2 1.8 3.7 5.1
Oman 0.0 2.2 0.0 3.8 0.6 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 47.0 5.0 0.6 4.7 4.9 0.8 0.0 3.3 \.7 69.7 4.7
Paraguay 0.1 0.5 0.7 \.2 9.9 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 3.9 2.1 0.8 2.4 5.8 1.0 6.4 3.7 7.9 14.3 7.2
Peru 14.8 12.0 19.5 19.7 12.1 12.0 12.0 12.5 12.0 12.0 16.4 15.7 17.9 14.9 18.9 0.0 13.0 12.0 12.0 14.0
Philippines 12.7 20.8 30.0 30.0 22.1 15.9 18.4 16.8 30.0 10.3 2\.9 26.9 19.2 25.9 35.4 30.0 4\.5 13.7 29.1 24.5
Poland 18.1 38.4 3.3 12.8 2.8 9.8 20.0 22.1 6.1 18.9 4.3 8.5 13.8 15.5 5.7 5.5 11.1 5.6 9.4 10.0
South Africa 0.4 2.9 12.8 1.2 3.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 20.0 0.6 20.8 17.5 9.0 12.9 7.0 23.6 10.3 2.3 7.4 11.5
Singapor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Sri Lanka 35.0 26.9 28.7 34.4 14.6 10.0 35.0 13.6 35.0 20.0 11.0 25.9 23.7 26.6 13.7 35.0 33.2 18.1 21.9 15.5
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Taiwan 2.5 3.9 33.2 42.2 8.5 9.3 5.0 14.8 23.9 3.6 28.5 3.3 16.8 31.2 9.5 30.7 25.3 3.2 41.5 26.1
Thailand 22.4 8.9 60.0 54.1 47.9 2.5 19.8 14.1 60.0 17.6 59.4 2.8 12.3 34.0 10.3 0.0 21.0 8.7 21.6 25.8
Tunisia 17.7 24.1 43.0 27.2 32.9 23.3 25.3 34.1 0.0 17.4 35.8 24.4 26.5 42.9 27.1 42.5 29.4 19.4 4\.6 30.5
U.S. 0.1 24.5 0.2 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 3.4 15.2 3.9 6.2 1.0 11.0 0.3 5.8 4.8
Venzuela 12.8 11.2 15.0 15.0 7.6 9.4 9.2 12.2 10.0 5.8 19.1 14.1 19.4 17.6 17.3 0.0 19.4 17.2 17.4 16.2
Table 2. Trade Weighted Average Barriers, 1998 (Cont.)
Weighted Average Non-Tariff Barriers, 1998
Industry
011 013 016 017 018 021 025 027 081 083 091 201 202 203 204 20S 206 207 208 209
Argentina 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 82.0 100.0 49.5100.0 4.0 17.4 67.1 23.8 35.6 66.7 0.0 42.2 12.5 11.4 15.0
Australia 0.3 0.0 0.0 98.5 22.2 0.0 92.5 6.6 0.0 0.1 80.8 2.3 91.4 63.8 22.7 43.6 69.7 64.6 99.3 51.3
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Brazil 99.0 92.0100.0 97.1 90.7 97.7 100.0 96.3 100.0 93.3 100.0 78.9 96.5 98.9 18.1 0.0 34.4 38.2 61.0 78.2
Canada 7.9 0.9 3.1 2.3 0.0 65.2 84.9 45.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.6 56.1 10.1 17.8 38.2 31.7 0.5 45.2 23.7
Chile 96.6 18.0 82.7 58.0 84.8 97.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 75.9 93.6 71.4 37.4 69.4 0.0 0.3 47.7 53.7 0.2
China 98.1 94.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 96.8 97.1 22.2 100.0 92.5 0.0 82.1 57.5 0.0 59.9 0.0 74.8 68.8 24.0 0.0
Colombia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Czchslvk 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.6 0.0 9..1 0.0 0.0 2.0 9.9 0.0
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Europe 4.4 7.6 58.6 35.4 64.7 30.4 25.0 55.6 100.0 0.1 25.2 67.8 53.6 59.2 15.3 0.0 16.6 5.2 65.2 13.8
Hong Kong 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 21.9 0.0 6.4 4.3 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 6.6 19.1
India 14.0 3.4 100.0 59.7 99.7 3.6 0.0 98.9 0.0 94.9 99.8 12.4 99.5 98.3 97.3 92.6 4.5 99.9 94.9 84.3
Japan 100.0 75.2 87.4 99.9 100.0 32.4 100.0 94.2 100.0 100.0 98.8 99.7 96.4 97.4 100.0 4.2 96.9 99.9 99.9 97.0
Korea RP 72.3 15.7 55.1 11.3 61.5 10.3 48.1 7.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 37.4 24.0 20.4 31.7 0.0 5.2 1.2 15.2 10.7
Malaysia 100.0 27.0 95.8 62.8 35.6 57.6 100.0 88.8 100.0 0.0 0.4 88.5 51.1 1.8 27.9 0.0 59.7 0.6 33.5 8.4
Mexico 100.0 90.1 100.0 97.0 99.7 99.2 100.0 86.8 100.0 1.0 97.7 70.6 95.6 75.0 91.3 82.0 78.0 15.3 84.8 84.5
New ZcaIand 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Norway 97.1 52.2 86.0 96.8 94.0 7.1 33.1 29.8 100.0 55.8 99.9 59.8 82.1 90.7 99.3 37.6 91.9 97.6 91.1 69.3
Oman 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.6 0.0
Paraguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Peru 90.2 83.7 98.8 99.2 64.4 2.2 100.0 96.4 0.0 0.0 54.5 17.1 69.0 0.0 78.4 0.0 55.0 59.9 34.5 25.3
Philipp. 90.0 0.0 32.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 10.1 26.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.4 0.0 0.0 52.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S.Afric:a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Singapor 22.1 23.8 100.0 92.6 82.3 100.0 69.3 75.6 100.0 5.2 87.7 99.0 8.1 24.9 49.3 0.0 11.6 93.3 30.9 8.7
Sr.1..aDka 73.9 5.1 48.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 75.9 7.5 0.4 36.0 80.0 33.9 33.7 36.3
Swiwld 0.0 5.7 22.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 4.5 8.5 0.0 4.1 0.3 14.8 5.4
Taiwan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Thailand 100.0 11.8 100.0 96.6100.0 33.0 95.4 73.1 100.0 5.1 100.0 3.6 94.2 100.0 96.2 0.0 63.1 98.0 64.2 56.5
Tunisia I.3 44.2 0.0 56.1 0.0 0.0 48.1 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 55.3 65.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 34.6 8.4
u.s. 4.0 6.7 62.7 19.3 22.6 17.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.7 15.7 10.2 13.8 16.3 0.0 13.2 0.2 63.9 10.8
Venezuela 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 11.2 96.5 86.8 99.9 100.0 100.0 0.0100.0 96.9 100.0 95.4
Table 3. Country Barriers
Non-Tariff Barriers Tariffs
Cntry Wgt94 Wgt98 DiftW Smp94 Smp98 DifI'S Wgt94 Wgt98 DifTW Smp94 Smp98 DifI'S
Argntina 6.6 49.1 42.6 1.1 52.8 51.8 6.3 8.1 1.8 5.9 12.0 6.0
Australia 25.7 62.3 36.6 36.9 38.3 1.4 4.1 2.2 -1.9 8.0 4.8 -3.2
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 9.9 9.9 0.0
Brazil 51.1 70.3 19.2 63.9 68.8 4.9 9.2 10.4 1.3 13.2 11.8 -1.4
Canada 9.5 19.9 10.5 13.1 14.4 1.3 2.4 1.1 -1.3 7.5 6.0 -1.5
Chile 97.3 57.2 -40.1 98.7 44.8 -53.9 11.0 11.0 0.0 11.0 11.0 0.0
China 83.4 73.6 -9.8 17.7 13.1 -4.6 15.9 50.7 34.8 40.6 25.9 -14.7
Colombia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 14.1 2.4 13.9 14.8 0.9
Czchslvk 2.2 3.2 1.0 3.7 3.7 0.0 7.1 7.5 0.4 15.1 10.2 -4.9
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 11.7 3.4 11.5 15.3 3.8
Europe 28.7 28.7 0.0 30.7 30.7 0.0 6.3 5.8 -0.5 11.6 10.0 -1.7
Hong Kong 37.9 0.0 -37.9 26.6 0.0 -26.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 0.0 2.9 2.9 0.0 3.1 3.1 17.7 24.9 7.2 22.1 34.2 12.1
India 87.0 72.5 -14.5 92.7 79.1 -13.6 46.5 26.0 -20.5 53.9 46.7 -7.1
Japan 96.1 96.7 0.6 95.5 95.4 -0.1 10.5 12.6 2.1 15.1 13.6 -1.5
KoreaRP 16.4 29.8 13.4 19.0 13.7 -5.3 11.8 114.0 102.2 17.5 38.6 21.1
Malaysia 49.1 44.4 -4.7 29.8 30.2 0.3 6.4 3.3 -3.0 14.0 11.7 -2.2
Mexico 59.4 68.3 8.9 55.7 81.2 25.5 9.3 20.6 11.3 14.9 17.4 2.4
New Zealand 3.9 3.3 -0.6 0.0 0.3 0.3 6.9 1.1 -5.8 10.0 5.2 -4.8
Norway 92.4 88.4 -4.0 83.5 82.0 -1.4 0.8 5.9 5.1 8.4 34.4 26.0
Oman 2.5 1.1 -1.4 3.4 3.4 0.0 4.2 4.4 0.2 9.0 10.7 1.7
Paraguay 9.5 0.0 -9.5 9.1 0.0 -9.1 8.8 6.8 -2.0 16.1 14.5 -1.5
Peru 0.7 66.6 65.9 1.9 25.1 23.2 15.7 15.1 -0.6 18.5 15.0 -3.4
Philippines 87.0 22.4 -64.7 84.7 9.1 -75.5 14.3 23.2 9.0 23.3 26.8 3.5
Poland 5.4 0.0 -5.4 1.2 0.0 -1.2 10.0 12.8 2.8 14.1 31.2 17.0
South Africa 88.7 0.0 -88.7 85.9 0.0 -85.9 5.4 6.9 1.5 16.7 16.9 0.2
Singapor 26.4 47.5 21.1 42.9 48.8 5.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.9 1.8 -1.2
Sri Lanka 32.6 49.3 16.7 2.3 5.0 2.7 28.5 24.8 -3.7 31.9 25.8 -6.1
Switzerland 70.2 7.1 -63.1 71.8 4.6 -67.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Taiwan 87.4 0.0 -87.4 79.2 0.0 -79.2 9.6 14.5 4.9 24.3 25.5 1.2
Thailand 12.0 71.7 59.7 7.1 79.6 72.5 33.6 21.8 -11.8 41.5 35.3 -6.1
Tunisia 77.0 12.6 -64.4 63.2 9.8 -53.4 23.2 24.1 0.8 30.8 34.7 3.9
U.S. 19.9 14.7 -5.1 11.3 6.0 -5.3 1.9 3.7 1.8 7.5 8.7 1.2
Venzuela 95.6 95.9 0.3 95.7 97.4 1.7 13.5 15.7 2.2 21.1 15.5 -5.6
MEAN 40.0 34.1 -5.9 36.1 27.7 -8.5 10.9 15.1 4.2 16.5 17.5 1.0
MIN 0.0 0.0 -88.7 0.0 0.0 -85.9 0.0 0.0 -20.5 0.0 0.0 -14.7
MAX 97.3 96.7 65.9 98.7 97.4 72.5 46.5 114.0 102.2 53.9 46.7 26.0
Table 4. Agricultural Sector Barriers
Sector Wgt94 Wgt98 diftW Smp94Smp98 diffS
Non-Tariff Barriers
SIC-{)11 Cash Grains 55.1 49.2 -5.9 41.1 35.5 -5.6
SIC-{)13 Field CroPS. Except Cash Grains 37.0 34.6 -2.4 31.8 26.9 -4.9
SIC-{)16 Vegetables and Melons 47.6 54.1 6.6 40.6 33.4 -7.2
SIC-{)17 Fruits andT~ Nuts 35.5 34.9 -0.6 40.3 34.7 -5.6
SIC-018 Horticultura1 Specialties 50.3 51.2 0.8 35.1 34.7 -{).4
SIC-021 livestock., Except Dairy and Poultry 24.6 31.5 6.9 41.2 36.4 -4.8
SIC-{)25 Poultry and Eggs 54.5 41.0 -13.4 43.1 42.5 -{).7
SIC-{)27 Animal Specialties 47.8 40.8 -7.0 38.8 33.4 -5.4
SIC-{)81 Timber Tracts 72.7 61.3 -11.4 42.0 45.2 3.1
SIC-083 Forest Products 26.5 28.4 1.9 23.9 17.2 -6.6
SIC-{)91 Commercial FIShing 56.4 54.7 -1.6 48.9 38.3 -10.5
SIC-201 Meat Products 66.3 60.9 -5.4 41.5 32.7 -8.8
SIC-202 Dairy Products 63.1 44.6 -18.5 46.3 38.7 -7.7
SIC-203 Preserved Fruits and Vegetables 40.6 46.8 6.3 31.7 24.9 -6.7
SIC-204 Grain Mill Products 50.3 35.1 -15.2 31.2 31.4 0.1
SIC-205 Bakery Products 13.0 10.5 -2.5 26.7 21.1 -5.6
SIC-206 Sugar and Confectionery Products 44.8 33.4 -11.3 29.5 22.7 -6.9
SIC-207 Fats and OiIs 29.7 29.4 -{).3 33.6 26.2 -7.4
SIC-208 Beverages 57.1 46.7 -10.5 35.5 37.2 1.7
SIC-209 Misc. Food and Kindred Products 37.2 35.2 -2.1 29.5 26.5 -3.0
MEAN 43.3 39.2 -4.1 34.9 30.4 -4.4
MIN 13.0 10.5 -18.5 23.9 17.2 -10.5
MAX 72.7 61.3 6.9 48.9 45.2 3.1
Tariffs
SIC-{)11 Cash Grains 3.0 59.9 57.0 11.5 25.1 13.7
SIC-{)13 Field Crops. Except Cash Grains 2.5 14.6 12.1 12.4 17.8 5.5
SIC-{)16 Vegetables and Melons 3.7 3.6 0.0 13.2 14.7 1.5
SIC-017 Fruits andT~ Nuts 5.0 5.1 0.1 14.9 17.0 2.1
SIC-018 Horticultural Specialties 4.1 6.0 1.9 11.9 13.7 1.8
SIC-021 livestock. Except Dairy and Poultry 1.3 2.5 1.2 11.4 9.8 -1.6
SIC-025 Poultry and Eggs 3.8 4.6 0.8 14.2 28.8 14.6
SIC-027 Animal Specialties 4.4 4.3 -0.1 16.1 14.8 -1.4
SIC-081 Timber Tracts 5.8 3.9 -2.0 12.2 10.6 -1.6
SIC-083 Forest Products 3.0 4.1 1.1 12.9 13.4 0.5
SIC-{)91 Commercial Fishing 6.9 6.5 -0.4 17.4 16.4 -1.0
SIC-201 Meat Products 12.2 11.4 -0.7 17.0 17.8 0.8
SIC-202 Dairy Products 11.4 15.1 3.7 19.5 21.0 1.5
SIC-203 Preserved Fruits and Vegetables 12.6 12.1 -0.4 18.5 17.7 -0.8
SIC-204 Grain Mill Products 5.1 11.7 6.6 15.3 21.9 6.6
SIC-205 Bakery Products 5.9 5.3 -{).7 16.8 15.5 -1.3
SIC-206 Sugar and Confectionery Products 9.2 11.6 2.4 18.2 18.7 0.5
SIC-207 Fats and Oils 5.1 10.1 4.9 14.1 14.8 0.7
SIC-208 Beverages 12.4 14.7 2.3 24.5 26.4 1.8
SIC-209 Misc. Food and Kindred Products 9.1 9.1 0.0 16.7 15.8 -0.9
MEAN 6.0 10.3 4.3 14.7 16.8 2.1
MIN 1.3 2.5 -2.0 11.4 9.8 -1.6
MAX 12.6 59.9 57.0 24.5 28.8 14.6
Table 5. Country NTB Coverage by NTB Type
Weighted Average NTHs Simple Average NTHs
1994 1994
PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE
Argentina 0.0 0.0 5.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
Australia 0.0 0.0 18.5 7.1 0.0 0.0 22.0 14.9
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Brazil 0.0 0.0 50.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 63.5 0.8
canada 0.6 4.9 4.2 0.0 0.0 5.7 7.5 0.0
Chile 18.9 0.0 87.4 0.0 3.2 0.0 96.3 0.0
China 0.0 0.0 82.1 14.6 0.0 0.0 16.2 3.2
Colombia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Czchslvk 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Europe 16.9 0.5 5.1 11.2 16.7 0.8 9.4 9.0
Hong Kong 0.0 2.6 35.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 26.1 0.0
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 0.0 28.6 0.0 83.8 0.0 10.6 0.0 91.7
Japan 5.4 13.1 95.7 28.7 2.6 11.7 94.9 18.3
Korea RP 0.0 7.2 16.4 0.0 0.0 0.8 19.0 0.0
Malaysia 0.0 0.0 39.7 15.6 0.0 0.0 26.3 8.4
Mexico 0.0 3.2 0.0 59.2 0.0 1.8 0.0 54.8
New Zealand 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Norway 24.2 18.9 77.3 6.3 9.1 12.4 75.5 13.0
Oman 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0
Paraguay 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0
Peru 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
Philipp. 0.0 9.7 78.9 40.6 0.0 10.1 66.7 26.4
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
South Africa 0.0 40.8 0.0 88.4 0.0 6.1 0.0 85.0
Singapor 0.0 2.1 16.9 10.0 0.9 1.4 29.5 12.2
Sri Lanka 9.5 0.0 0.0 23.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.9
Switzer1and 17.3 22.7 27.5 25.5 2.6 16.9 45.4 24.1
ChinaTW 0.0 3.4 68.5 50.6 0.0 0.4 55.9 74.1
Thailand 0.0 2.3 0.6 9.6 0.0 3.4 0.2 3.8
Tunisia 0.0 43.5 75.7 0.0 0.0 8.7 60.3 0.0
U.S. 9.8 11.9 4.7 0.3 6.3 5.1 0.9 0.0
Venzuela 0.0 19.0 95.6 7.4 0.0 3.6 95.5 15.0
Table 5. Country NTB Coverage by NTB Type (Cont.)
Weighted Average NTBs Simple Average NTBs
1998 1998
PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE
Argentina 0.2 15.9 37.7 8.9 0.7 14.7 45.2 11.8
Australia 0.1 0.0 62.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.3 0.0
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Brazil 7.5 2.2 70.3 4.0 1.5 0.5 67.3 8.0
Canada 17.3 0.0 2.8 0.0 6.9 0.0 7.6 0.0
Chile 20.9 0.0 50.0 1.5 4.1 0.0 40.5 5.3
China 28.2 40.2 67.5 0.0 1.3 5.7 9.1 0.0
Colombia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C:zchslvk 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 . 0.0
Europe 15.5 3.0 14.8 0.0 15.1 1.9 19.4 0.0
Hong Kong 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 0.0 1.1 0.9 1.8 0.0 2.5 0.6 0.2
India 0.0 47.1 36.5 1.7 0.0 12.2 70.5 5.7
Japan 5.7 11.6 95.4 39.5 2.0 8.8 94.7 21.3
Korea RP 0.0 29.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 0.0 0.0
Malaysia 0.0 3.7 33.2 13.3 0.0 1.4 19.8 14.2
Mexico 2.9 12.2 64.3 24.2 0.8 4.1 64.1 22.2
New Zealand 3.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Norway 21.6 33.0 76.2 0.0 8.8 32.8 74.9 0.0
Oman 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0
Paraguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Peru 43.3 0.0 66.6 0.0 2.3 0.4 24.8 0.0
Philipp. 0.0 4.4 17.9 0.0 0.0 2.8 6.4 0.0
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
South Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Singapor 0.0 0.4 44.1 3.4 0.0 1.2 47.0 0.9
Sri Lanka 6.1 0.0 38.5 6.6 0.3 0.0 3.3 1.5
Switzerland 1.7 3.3 2.5 0.0 0.4 1.3 3.2 0.0
Taiwan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Thailand 0.0 2.1 71.7 0.0 0.0 1.5 79.6 0.0
Tunisia 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
U.S. 13.1 2.3 0.6 0.0 5.2 0.7 0.2 0.0
Venzuela 42.5 0.0 95.6 50.1 12.4 0.0 92.8 57.9
Table 6. Sector NTB Coverage Ratios by NTB Type
PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE
Weighted Average NTBs Simple Average NTBs
1994 1994
SIC-oII Cash Grains 2.4 10.7 47.1 8.7 0.8 9.0 23.9 18.4
SIC-013 Field Crops, Exc. Cash Grains 0.9 2.2 29.5 7.1 0.2 2.1 19.1 14.5
SIC-ol6 Vegetables and Melons 23.0 10.9 16.3 2.6 2.3 2.1 21.8 18.8
SIC-ol7 Fruits and Tree Nuts 21.1 1.5 14.6 1.8 1.5 2.2 25.6 16.0
SIC-ol8 Horticultural Specialties 17.4 1.3 33.7 4.7 0.8 2.0 22.0 13.7
SIC-021 livestock. Exc. Dairy and Poultry 1.2 0.5 20.4 10.1 1.2 3.0 27.7 15.0
SIC-025 Poultry and Eggs 5.3 S.3 40.3 4.3 O.S 4.S 2S.7 IS.I
SIC-027 Animal Specialties 0.0 3.4 29.7 14.2 0.1 1.4 21.2 19.9
SIC-OSI Timber Tracts 2.3 0.0 70.2 0.9 3.0 0.0 27.4 15.5
SIC-oS3 Forest Products 0.0 0.9 23.8 7.4 0.4 . 1.2 14.7 10.2
SIC-091 Commercial Fishing 1.6 7.9 50.1 34.4 0.4 0.6 24.2 29.3
SIC-201 Meat Products 9.3 11.3 61.6 7.5 1.0 3.3 24.2 19.9
SIC-202 Dairy Products 14.8 15.8 28.5 29.0 1.3 7.5 26.3 16.7
SIC-203 Preserved Fruits and Vegetables 12.0 3.1 23.4 12.4 0.7 0.6 20.7 11.8
SIC-204 Grain Mill Products 10.2 6.1 21.8 28.3 1.0 6.S 18.1 11.1
SIC-205 Bakery Products 5.6 4.3 5.0 0.0 2.0 5.5 16.4 3.9
SIC-206 Sugar and Confectionery Products 15.2 12.2 23.4 13.1 1.7 4.0 19.6 8.5
SIC-207 Fats and Oils 2.2 1.7 22.6 9.1 1.0 4.7 22.7 11.3
SIC-208 Beverages 20.1 22.6 26.2 12.2 3.1 7.1 24.6 10.3
SIC-209 Misc. Food and Kindred Products 3.9 5.6 2S.4 14.8 0.4 1.6 19.4 11.4
Weighted Average NTBs Simple Average NTBs
1998 1998
SIC-oll Cash Grains 10.9 15.9 37.1 1.9 3.0 6.3 31.1 6.2
SIC-013 Field Crops, Exc. Cash Grains 9.4 9.3 31.0 1.1 1.0 2.6 25.0 6.2
SIC-ol6 Vegetables and Melons 29.1 1.6 26.3 0.1 2.7 4.5 30.8 2.6
SIC-017 Fruits and Tree Nuts 17.2 3.5 19.1 0.2 1.7 2.9 32.S 3.6
SIC-O18 Horticultural Specialties 16.3 7.4 42.2 1.7 0.8 3.6 30.1 9.7
SIC-021 Livestock, Exc. Dairy and Poultry 7.9 S.3 25.0 2.2 0.6 5.2 29.7 7.2
SIC-025 Poultry and Eggs 5.6 3.0 33.3 3.3 1.3 3.6 38.4 9.0
SIC-027 Animal Specialties 0.0 2.3 26.5 10.8 0.5 1.5 26.3 11.9
SIC-OS I Timber Tracts 1.9 0.0 60.6 1.3 3.0 6.9 36.3 20.0
SIC-083 Forest Products 0.0 11.0 28.3 0.1 0.4 1.9 14.5 5.1
SIC-091 Commercial Fishing 1.9 6.7 50.6 43.6 0.5 1.0 27.8 13.3
SIC-20l Meat Products 12.4 4.7 54.3 5.0 1.9 2.6 28.2 5.4
SIC-202 Dairy Products 8.0 11.7 32.1 10.7 6.6 5.2 30.5 9.9
SIC-203 Preserved Fruits and Vegetables 17.1 5.5 36.9 2.3 1.1 1.2 23.8 1.0
SIC-204 Grain Mill Products 12.0 10.4 26.5 6.7 3.7 5.8 25.3 1.0
SIC-205 Bakery Products 8.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 5.9 0.0 16.3 0.0
SIC-206 Sugar and Confectionery Products 8.2 6.3 26.4 4.1 2.9 4.0 19.9 1.6
SIC-207 Fats and Oils 2.1 4.2 25.6 1.2 3.0 4.9 21.2 3.1
SIC-208 Beverages 17.9 \4.\ 27.4 4.3 6.7 5.0 30.8 0.8
SIC-209 Misc. Food and Kindred Products 4.4 4.9 29.2 17.0 1.2 1.7 22.9 4.4
Table 7. Tariff Reduction, Diversion and Compression Effects
Developed Developing
1994 1998 1994 1998
Tariff Reduction Effects
SIC-OIl -18.90 ••• -2.39 -3.49 -5.37 •••
SIC-013 -17.59 ••• -6.62··· -5.39 ••• 137
SIC-016 -24.41 ••• -11.51 ••• 2.00 -5.10
SIC-017 -12.84 ... -6.35 ••• -7.60 ... -4.60 ••
SIC-018 -10.69 ••• -8.38 ... -4.40 ... -4.86 •••
SIC-021 -41.03 ••• -9.87 -9.70 •• 0.69
SIC-025 -61.29 ... 2.42 -2.79
-12.44 •
SIC-027 -15.20·" 5.88 • 0.76 0.76
SIC-081 108.25 ... -16.90 145.97 63.10
SIC-083 1.61 1.95 -0.69 5.67··
SIC-091 -4.45 -15.60 ••• -8.50 ••• -10.91 ...
SIC-201 -32.05 ••• -13.21 ••• -16.18 ••• -6.98 ...
SIC-202 7.63·· -6.76··· -4.66 ••• -10.24 •••
SIC-203 -4.07 •• -6.16 ••• -2.70·· -5.13 •••
SIC-204 -11.85 ••• -3.14 •• -0.32 -4.65·"
SIC-205 12.22 12.79 0.72 -2.56
SIC-206 -9.71 ••• -7.68 ••• -1.06 -10.46 •••
SIC-207 -24.73··· -21.62 ••• -6.02 ••• -9.27 ...
SIC-208 -0.63 -5.43 ••• -9.72·" -3.09 •••
SIC-209 -6.50·" -6.70 ... -3.19 ••• -9.50 •••
Tariff Compressions Effects
SIC-011 -0.46 0.634 ••• -0.69 0.52
SIC-013 2.59 ••• 1.404 ...
-0.91 • -0.27
SIC-ol6 1.47 •• 0.750 0.48 0.92
SIC-Ol7 2.34 ... 1.114 ..
-1.01 • 0.53
SIC-018 -2.01 .. 0.111
-0.86 • 0.16
SIC-021 0.07 1.336 -1.25 -3.03
SIC-025 0.41
-1.178 • 0.17 2.30·"
SIC-027 0.29 0.345 0.46 1.17 •••
SIC-081 1.54 0.140 -0.42 2.87 •
SIC-083 -7.21 •••
-0.782 • -0.91 -1.89 ••
SIC-091 -0.78 1.899 ... 1.24 ••• 1.22···
SIC-201 2.08··· 2.018 ••• 0.99··· 0.70···
SIC-202 -1.26 0.092 -1.28 ••• 0.01 ..
SIC-203 0.49 0.803 .. -0.31 -0.81
SIC-204 1.76·· 0.456 • -2.96 ... -1.01 ..
SIC-205 0.98 0.678 1.39 • -0.66 •••
SIC-206 0.75 1.307 ••• -1.37 ... 0.67
SIC-207 1.96·· 0.521 -1.11 ••
-0.16 •
SIC-208 0.38 1.507 ... 0.92··· 0.76
SIC-209 0.69 0.544 -0.45 0.59···
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Developed Developing
1994 1998 1994 1998
Tariff Diversion Effects
-27.09 • -5.65 -31.48 ... -4.79 •••
-9.92 1.96 -38.24 ••• -0.16
-29.67 ••• -36.02 •••
-2.54
-2.52 •





212.16 ••• 38.73 11.93 ..
174.09
248.76··· -18.86 -19.41 •• -0.12
-2.49 -16.98 -14.96 .. 1.20
-8.69 -7.18·· 756.86 -9.30 ..
54.69·" -21.96 -4.49 0.78
-7.38·" -43.88·" -3.65 4.41
9.34 0.41 -0.07 -0.66 •••
-25.11 ••• -1.71 •••
-6.70·· -0.39 •••
-12.40 ••• -21.82 ••• 4.43 -1.78 ...
-7.85 0.31 -14.60 ... -2.07 ...
-16.39 •• -23.48 ••
-9.05 -2.20 ••
-7.88 ••• -9.83 •••
-1.47 -2.29 •••
-7.51 • -20.95·" -9.39 .. -0.65 •••
-12.19 ...
-9.74·" 0.95 0.32 •••
-14.37 ••• -17.24 •••
-1.47 -2.50·"
Table 8. Non-Tariff Barrier Reduction Effects
SIC PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE
1994 1998
Developed Countries Reduction Effects
SIC-OIl 3.70 •••
-0.69 0.13 -4.48 ••• 2.95··· 2.09 •• 0.86 NA
SIC-013 2.66·· -3.62 ••• 0.99·· -1.53 ••• 1.15 3.56··· -0.59 17.44
SIC-016 -0.19 3.30···
-5.40 • -0.21 1.11 • 1.59 •• -2.85 ••• NA
SIC-Ol7 0.79 3.43 •••
-1.18 • -0.79 0.01 2.51 ••• -0.71 0.69
SIC-018 4.29··· 1.29 0.46 -1.90 ••• 0.53 0.72 2.43 ••• 1.51
SIC-021 -4.10 -0.15 1.58 • -0.15 4.96 • -1.71 -2.06 •• -19.20
SIC-025 5.42 4.74 -0.61 4.42
-43.33 -2.61 0.60 -19.57 ••
SIC-027 -9.51 -1.05 -0.03 -0.27 0.66 3.72 •• 2.03··· -9.84 •••
SIC-081 NA NA 3.11 ••• 43.06 •••
-0.84 NA NA NA
SIC-083 3.13 1303.9 ••• 1.95 ••• 0.19 4.16·· 1.41 2.98 ••• -64.91
SIC-091 -7.30 ••• 26.22··· 0.57 -1.43 ••• 5.69··· 25.82 ••• 0.73 • -3.93 •••
SIC-201 -4.53 •••
-0.43 0.04 -0.22 -1.91 -5.02··· 1.40··· 7.17···
SIC-202 5.41 •••
-0.14 -0.81 -2.74 ••• 1.04 -1.84 •• 1.63 ••• -2.34 ••
SIC-203 -0.97 -0.29 -0.79 0.46 0.30 1.08 -1.07 ••• -3.67
SIC-204 -0.88 -0.39 -0.79 0.42 -0.95 -0.34 1.74··· NA
SIC-205 -0.30 -2.89 -0.20 NA -0.44 NA 1.71 • NA
SIC-206 1.16··· -0.22 -2.58 ••• -0.13 2.16··· 0.97 -0.24 7.10
SIC-207 4.60··· -1.28 0.39 -1.04 -1.47 2.28··· 0.72 • 1.78
SIC-208 0.25 1.66 • 1.33 •• -0.25 0.18 0.95 1.23 ••• 0.60
SIC-209 -0.30 3.08··· 0.82·· 1.04 ••• 1.49·· -0.99 0.90··· 6.18
Developing Countries Reduction Effects
SIC-Oil 9.83 ••• -7.62 ••• 3.40 ••• 2.52 -1.11 -3.38 ••• 0.77 -2.00 ••
SIC-DB -2.26 1.16 0.03 0.81
-2.57 • 4.14··· 2.11 ••• 2.16···
SIC-016 14.38 •• 6.99 6.07··· -4.45 5.25 2.08 2.98 • 2.10 •
SIC-Ol7 NA -1.25 3.03·· 0.46 -4.94 -0.18 2.09 ••• 0.75
SIC-0l8 NA -3.97 ••• -1.81 ••• -8.57 ••• NA -1.02 0.18 -0.08
SIC-021 6.68··· 0.53 6.95 ... -3.05 ••• NA -1.19 3.60 ••• 2.70···
SIC-025 NA -4.85
-2.71 • -3.40 •• 2.85 -3.19 -0.76 NA
SIC-027 NA -0.24 0.25 4.40··· -0.11 0.46 2.89 ••• 2.62 ...
SIC-081 NA NA NA NA NA 5.43 -13.98 23.34
SIC-083 NA -5.10·" 1.16 .. -0.55 NA -1.91 -3.16 ••• 1.50
SIC-091 NA NA 1.79 -0.02 NA 9.42··· 0.21 -0.32
SIC-20l -2.74 16.00 ... 1.15 •• -2.32 ••• 7.13 -1.15 2.45 •••
-1.23 •
SIC-202 -0.91 -1.59 -3.11 ••• -1.55 1.04 4.13 ••• -0.98 ••• -3.42 •••
SIC-203 -3.23 -144.0 3.23·" -1.21 2.19 -9.06
-0.66 • 3.82
SIC-204 -7.83 -7.04 ... -1.23 .. -4.51 n. 1.91 •• -2.49 •••
-0.88 ••
-2.74·"
SIC-205 NA 2.53 -3.43 .. 1.46 NA NA -19.25 NA
SIC-206 NA -0.70 3.78 ••• -0.78 0.14 -3.33 •• 0.14 4.09 •
SIC-207 2.72 1.81 0.39 0.51 1.25 -2.86·· -0.40 -0.12
SIC-208 NA 5.39·· -5.82 ••• -1.08 6.59 ••• 4.65···
-0.67 • 7.72 •••
SIC-209 1.93 -4.03 -0.33 -2.05 ••• 7.86 ••• 2.40 -0.16 2.08 •••
NA Not available
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Table 9. Non-Tariff Barrier Compression Effects
PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE PRICE QUANT QUAL LICENSE
1994 1998
Developed Countries Compression Effects
SIC-ol1 -0.58 •• 0.05 0.25 0.08
-0.56 • 0.68·· -0.42 • NA
SIC-013 0.86 0.53 0.08 0.04 -0.39 -0.61 ••
-0.13 1.49
SIC-ol6 -0.13 0.57·· 0.03 -0.32 -0.33 •• -0.68 .. 0.09 NA
SIC-ol7 0.03 1.40··· 0.31 ••
-0.34 • 0.19 -0.51 -0.14 -0.60
SIC-018 -0.13 -0.58 -0.11 0.67·" -0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.57
SIC-021 -1.15 -0.57 -0.17 0.50·· -0.98 0.53 0.25 -0.49
SIC-Q25
-1.58 • -0.36 -0.39 -0.28 8.76 0.22 -0.41 -6.34
SIC-027 10.75
-0.92 • -0.01 -0.20 -0.39 -0.54 -0.30 •• -0.27
SIC-081 0.68 NA 0.36 0.57 -0.13 NA NA NA
SIC-083
-1.24 • -3.87 -0.59 •• 0.01 0.16 0.04 -1.53 ... 0.60
SIC-091 0.15 4.48··
-0.21 • -0.40 .. 0.00 1.42 -0.27 •• 0.65··
SIC-20l -0.06 -0.47 0.38 ••• -0.38·" 0.05 0.40
-0.23 • -0.94··
SIC-202 -0.76 ••• -0.06 0.72··· 0.89··· -1.07 ••• 0.07 -0.57 ••• 1.21 •••
SIC-203 -0.04 -0.11 0.07 -0.42··· -0.52 •••
-0.45 0.23 • -1.23
SIC-204 0.66 •• 0.10 0.12 -0.02 -0.16 0.06 -0.41 ••• NA
SIC-205 -0.25 0.25 0.32 NA -0.10 NA -0.11 NA
SIC-206 -0.20 -0.40 0.74·" 0.27
-0.32 • 0.04 -0.05 1.52
SIC-207 -0.41 0.38 0.04 0.00 -0.41
-0.47 • -0.26 • 0.74
SIC-208 -0.16 -0.13 0.01 -0.12 -0.33 ••• 0.07 -0.03 2.23
SIC-209 0.84 ••• 0.48 0.08 -0.22 0.37·· 0.49 0.00 -0.03
Developing Countries Compression Effects
SIC-Oil -0.07 0.34 0.02 -0.22 0.24 0.49 0.37··· -0.24
sic-on 1.36 0.54 -0.08 -0.73 .. 0.89 ..
-0.22 0.22 -0.06
SIC-016 -8.18 •• -1.29 -0.27 1.68 • -2.65 •• -0.57 •• 0.13 -0.62 •
SIC-Ol7 NA -0.20 -0.42·· -0.26 3.26 • 0.36 -0.35 .. -0.16
SIC-018 NA 0.00 0.21 1.67·" NA -0.07 0.14 0.21
SIC-021 -0.43 0.30 0.04 -0.26 NA 0.33 -0.02 0.47
SIC-025 NA 0.86 0.14 -0.11 -0.74 1.32 .. 0.44 • -0.48
SIC-027 NA -0.09 0.29 -0.27 -0.80 -0.49 0.01 -0.23
SIC-081 NA NA NA NA NA -0.51 0.09 0.20
SIC-083 NA 2.01 ••• 0.13 0.50·· NA 0.32 0.65 ••• -0.86 •••
SIC-091 NA NA -0.21 0.46·· NA -0.29 -0.07 -0.10
SIC-201 1.60 • -0.71 •• 0.74··· 0.65 ••• -0.34 -0.51 • 0.38 ... 0.61 •••
SIC-202 0.22 0.52 0.72·" 0.42 • 0.26 -0.21 0.25 ••• 0.43··
SIC-203 0.75 0.93 -0.11 -0.51 4.00 0.85 -0.08 -0.16
SIC-204 0.32 0.76 0.12 -0.09 0.58 .. -0.31 -0.18 0.39
SIC-205 NA
-1.21 • 1.23 • -1.45 •• NA NA -0.72 NA
SIC-206 NA 1.05 0.17 -0.12 -0.25 1.30·· -0.23 -0.08
SIC-207 -0.32 0.18 0.04 -0.04 -0.26 -0.07 0.31 ••• -0.23
SIC-208 NA -0.35 0.18 -0.37 0.35 -0.57 0.11 -1.28 •••
SIC-209 -2.09 •• -0.72 -0.55·" 0.32 0.06 -0.56
-0.24 • -0.21
NA Not available
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Table 10. Distance, Commor Border and Common Language Effects
Developed Developing Developed Developing
1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998
DISTANCE BORDER
SIC-oII -3.01 ... -2.80 ••• -5.13 ••• -4.58 •••
-0.26 0.07 2.28 ••• 1.60···
SIC-ol3 -2.% ••• -2.64 ••• -3.% ••• -3.75 •••
-0.07 0.08 1.38 ••• 1.67 •••
SIC-016 -4.02 ••• -3.70 ••• -4.76 ••• -5.06 ••• 1.00 • 2.53 ••• 2.96 ••• 1.04 •SIC-017 -3.40 ••• -2.70 ••• -4.40 ••• -3.99 ••• 0.28 1.00 • 1.41 ••• 0.60
SIC-018 -2.29 ••• -2.34 ••• -3.35 ••• -2.76 ••• 1.14" -0.39 1.04 • 1.33 •••
SIC-021 -3.27 ••• -2.85 ••• -3.34 ••• -3.27 ••• 3.33 ••• 1.67 • 3.18 ••• 3.49 •••
SIC-025 -3.72 ••• -4.74 ••• -3.93 ••• -4.65 ••• 6.62 ••• 2.32 5.78 ••• 1.69 •
SIC-027 -2.71 ••• -2.52 ••• -3.49 ••• -3.05 ••• 1.48 ••• 1.98 ••• 1.52 •• 1.83 ...
SIC-081 -1.20 ••• -2.01 ••• -5.23 •••
-2.74·" 2.52··· 1.40 0.88 1.23
SIC-083 -2.42··· -2.20 ••• -2.03 ... -2.21 ••• 1.38 •• 1.25 • 1.80 ••• 0.13
SIC-091 -3.05·" -2.74 ••• -3.80 ••• -3.59 ••• 1.85 ••• 1.44 ••• 2.90··· 0.46
SIC-201 -2.55 ••• -2.22 ••• -3.71 ••• -3.90 ... 2.14·" 1.69··· 2.44 ••• 1.82···
SIC-202 -2.55 ••• -2.26 ••• -3.72 ••• -3.49 ••• 0.08 -0.39 2.45 ••• 2.55 •••
SIC-203 -2.09 ••• -1.75 ••• ·3.21 ••• -3.06 ••• 0.93·" 0.51 1.24 ... 1.32···
SIC-204 -2.82 ••• -2.64 ••• -3.62 ••• -3.40 ••• 1.10·· 0.51 1.58 ••• 1.95···
SIC-205 -2.42 ••• -1.97 ••• -3.70 ••• -3.16 ••• 1.02 0.96 3.17 ••• 1.82···
SIC-206 -2.52 ••• -2.26 ••• -3.86 •••
-3.49·" 0.10 -0.22 1.32 ••• 0.36
SIC-207 -3.08 ••• -2.73 ••• -4.02 •••
-3.93·" 1.06 •• 0.46 -0.68 0.35
SIC-208 -2.18 ... -2.07 •••
-4.15·" -3.65 ••• 0.31 -0.31 0.56 0.71 ••
SIC-209 -1.98 ... -1.88 ••• -3.09 ... -2.91 ••• 0.42 0.32 0.57 • 0.76 ...
LANG
SIC-011 1.03 •• 1.235 ••• 0.87 0.52
SIC-Ol3 1.33 ••• 1.351 ... 0.13 0.83 ..
SIC-016 0.47 0.584 0.59 0.83
SIC-017 0.75·· 1.204 ... 0.24 1.21 •••
SIC-018 1.10 ••• 1.083 ... 0.35 1.80···
SIC-021 -0.26 0.052 3.48··· 2.45 ...
SIC-025 -1.51 0.163 2.44 3.56···
SIC-027 0.97·· 0.940 ••• 1.89·" 0.98 •
SIC-081 0.76 0.548 1.47 1.28
SIC-083 0.62 1.549 ••• 1.42 ... 1.37 •••
SIC-091 1.18 ... 0.855 •••
-0.99 0.43
SIC-201 0.73·· 1.025 ••• 0.39 1.53·"
SIC-202 1.14 ••• 1.409 ••• 1.11 ... 1.76·"
SIC-203 0.99··· 1.093 ••• 2.12··· 2.15 •••
SIC-204 1.26·" 1.381 ••• 1.84 ••• 1.80·"
SIC-205 1.96 ••• 1.353 •••
-1.68 • 0.52
SIC-206 1.86 ••• 1.485 ••• 1.38 ••• 2.61 •••
SIC-207 1.33 ••• 1.719 ••• 0.56 1.15 •••
SIC-208 1.92 ... 1.700 ••• 2.10··· 2.08 ...
SIC-209 1.72··· 1.581 ••• 1.37 ••• 2.16·"
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level







































































* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
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